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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), an international expert organisation legally based in Switzerland as a non-profit 
foundation, works for the elimination of mines, explosive remnants of war and other explosive hazards, such as unsafe munitions stockpiles. The GICHD 
provides advice and capacity development support, undertakes applied research, disseminates knowledge and best practices and develops standards. 
In cooperation with its partners, the GICHD's work enables national and local authorities in affected countries to effectively and efficiently plan, 
coordinate, implement, monitor and evaluate safe mine action programmes, as well as to implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions and other relevant instruments of international law. The GICHD follows the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
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Azerbaijan’s mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem is the result of 
both an internal war between Azerbaijan and Armenian separatists—which saw landmines laid 
by both sides throughout the duration of the conflict between 1992 and 1994—and Russia’s 
hasty and careless efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores, which left live rockets and shells 
strewn over large areas of southern Azerbaijan. 
 
To address its contamination problem, Azerbaijan created the Azerbaijan National Agency for 
Mine Action (ANAMA) in 1998. The ANAMA was charged with coordinating activities in the 
areas of demining, mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance. Having limited operational 
capacity, ANAMA signed an agreement with UNDP, creating the Azerbaijan National Mine 
Action Programme in 1999, which included a UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international 
financial contributions and the provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. With an eye on 
developing Azerbaijan’s national operational capacity, much of UNOPS’ contracting focused on 
hiring organisations like the Mine Advisory Group (MAG) and other private groups to help train 
national staff in demining and EOD, and UNICEF and the ICRC to integrate MRE into curricula of 
schools in mine/ERW affected districts and to train teachers to carry out MRE. 
 
Azerbaijan adopted its first national strategy in 2001, which mandated ANAMA to manage most 
mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal outside technical 
support.  The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the departure of the last Chief 
Technical Advisor, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor. In fact, since the 
programme was nationally owned in the first place, there was never a question of whether the 
programme would transition from the UN to national ownership. For this reason, the 
programme had mainly focused on gaining  knowledge in  mine action—a new field in 
Azerbaijan—and allocating resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended 
UN presence within the national agency.  ANAMA, therefore, sought to increase its national 
capacity and management control, while also welcoming support, but not authority, by the UN 
and other partners.  
 
Through full nationalisation, ANAMA began to develop new methods and procedures that were 
better adapted to the national situation. In addition, after nationalisation, a number of donors 
and the national government began to entrust ANAMA with more resources.  With greater 
responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff paid more 
attention to being efficient and effective, with a great measure of success. 
 
Azerbaijan illustrates that transition often refers to shifting the balance between foreign and 
national staff in decision-making at all levels, rather than fully shifting from a UN-led 
programme to a nationally-owned one.  The Azerbaijan case illustrates that the government 
itself initiated and had ultimate authority and ownership of the mine action programme from 
the beginning, even if external funding and operational support played a major role. ANAMA, 
then, demonstrates that national mine action programmes should aim to be fully nationalised 





Azerbaijan is located in the Caucasus region of southeast Europe, and shares borders 
with Russia, Iran, Turkey, Georgia and Armenia (Map 1).  The total population in 2011 
was over nine million people. Slightly more than 50 per cent live in urban areas, half of 
whom live in the capital city of Baku.  
 
Azerbaijan is a middle income country with an average GDP of just over USD 10,000.  
While agriculture remains an important source of employment, the single largest 
contributor to national income is the petroleum sector.  With the opening of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan petroleum pipeline in 2005, the economy has been fuelled by 
construction and other projects financed from petroleum proceeds.  Nonetheless, 
average salaries remain low by European standards, with low incomes particularly 
common among internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the areas affected by 
landmines and conflict. 
 
The mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a direct result of 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, which included Azerbaijan’s declaration of 
independence in October 1991. Two main factors, explained below, are the cause of the 
current problems.   
 
In 1988, Armenian separatists in the Azerbaijan districts of Nagorno-Karabakh declared 
their independence from Azerbaijan.  Separatists and Armenian forces, with Russian 
support, fought a war with Azerbaijan from 1992 until a ceasefire was signed in 1994.  
However, the parties have not signed a peace agreement and violations of the ceasefire 
at the line of control are frequent.  The separatist forces occupied Nagorno-Karabakh 
and seven surrounding districts, displacing an estimated 1.5 million people (nearly 20 
per cent of the population) in the process.  Some territory was recovered by Azerbaijan 
in 1993-94.   
 
The armies of both sides were trained by the Soviets as regards use of landmines, so 
sometimes laid pattern minefields. However, many of the fighters were irregular forces 
who followed more random approaches to landmine use.  Most of the population 
centres, water, power and road infrastructure, as well as some agricultural land in the 
areas that exchanged hands were affected by mines and ERW.   
 
Azerbaijan was an important element in the southern defence structure of the Soviet 
Union, ready for possible NATO assaults from Turkey or through Iran.  Many Soviet 
Army bases and training ranges were located in Azerbaijan, together with one of the 
Soviet Union’s largest arms stockpiles.  When the Soviet Army withdrew from 
Azerbaijan in 1991, efforts to destroy larger ammunition stores left live rockets and 
shells strewn over large areas.  Smaller quantities of munitions were buried near many 
bases.   
 




64 affected settlements and 60 square kilometres of contamination.  The Landmine 
Impact Survey (LIS) conducted in 2002-2003 identified 480 mine-affected communities 
in 18 out of 68 districts nationwide, with a total of 970 suspected hazardous areas 
(SHAs) affecting 514,000 people.  Nearly two-thirds of the SHAs were affected by 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) alone, with 163 SHAs over an area of 44 square kilometres 
contaminated by the explosive dispersal of UXO from the Saloglu arms storage site.  As 
many as 210 low impact communities with 307 SHAs had only UXO hazards creating one 
or zero blockages to livelihoods assets (eg crop land). More than half of mine-affected 
communities are in Fizuli district, while more than half of the UXO-affected 
communities are in Aghstafa district.   
 
The landmine/ERW situation in the currently occupied territories is unknown, although 
estimates suggest that it could be roughly comparable to the extent of problem in the 
accessible areas.  The extent of the use of mines around the current Azerbaijan National 
Army bases (away from the frontline) and on the borders with Russia, Iran, Georgia and 
Turkey is unknown, although some border minefields are reported to have been 
removed by the military.    
 
A total of 2,882 landmine victims are registered in the IMSMA database, as a result of all 
data collected since the first International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) efforts in 
1996.  Of those, 2,372 are clearly identified by sex, date of birth, date of incident and 
type of injury and the other 510 are classified as “other”.  Nearly all are victims of mines 
laid during the recent conflict.  The LIS identified 51 victims during the two years prior to 
the survey, of whom 98 per cent were men.  The number of victims has fallen from 
roughly five a month in 2005 to about one every two months in 2010 and 2011 (Table 
1).  The vast majority of victims are men between the ages of 18 and 40, often involved 
in mine accidents while on military duty.   
 
Demining (clearance and survey) has shown that, while landmines are widespread, 
mined areas are not generally dense.  Compared to other conflicts, anti-tank (AT) mines 
are relatively more common than AP (anti-personnel) mines.  The most widespread 







OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME 
Presidential Decree 854 of 18 July 1998 created the Azerbaijan National Agency for 
Mine Action (ANAMA), which reports to the Deputy Prime Minister as head of the State 
Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.  The Government of Azerbaijan and 
UNDP established the internationally supported national mine action programme on 2 
April 1999.   
 
ANAMA was created with the responsibility to coordinate action in areas of demining, 
mine risk education, and victim assistance. The agreement included the creation of a 
UNDP-managed trust fund to channel international and government financial 
contributions and provision of technical assistance through UNOPS. As of 2011, the 
Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme wascomprised of three main organisations 
plus other actors and activities, as they have developed from the early years of the 




Key Features of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme 
Strategic purpose Support recovery and rehabilitation of areas and 
population affected by conflict with Armenia 
NMAA/MAC ANAMA 
National demining operators ANAMA 
Relief Azerbaijan (RA-Dayag) 




National MRE operators ANAMA 
RA-Dayag 
IEFP 
Ministry of Education 
Community risk education committees 
National MVA operators Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection 
ANAMA (vocational training and micro credit) 
Core funding channels Government of Azerbaijan 
UNDP Trust Fund 
Bilateral donor cooperation 
Largest funders 
(over USD 1 million 
cumulative) 










By the end of 2010, ANAMA had eliminated nearly 50 per cent of the 306 square kilometres of 
SHAs identified during the 2006 review with local authorities, with 155 square kilometres 
remaining.  The national programme has been releasing land through clearance and 
survey at an annual rate of about 30 square kilometres since 2008 (Table 2).   
 
Prior to the establishment of ANAMA, the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) conducted 
mine clearance in the former conflict areas under their control.  This clearance 
reportedly focused on defensive minefields surrounding their own bases as well as on 
major roads and some other areas.  While ANA provided no minefield maps to ANAMA, 
it reportedly cleared over 19,000 AT and 22,000 AP mines from 15 minefields between 
1994 and 1997.  Establishment of ANAMA reflected the Government agreement with 
the international community that humanitarian mine action should be managed by a 
civilian agency. 
STRATEGY 
ANAMA’s core goal is to achieve an Azerbaijan where all people live free from the threat 
of landmines and ERW.  Its attention focuses on making it safe for IDP resettlement and 
removing hazardous obstacles to development projects.  It has a twofold strategy:   
 
(a) to ensure safety and remove hazards from the currently accessible areas affected by 
the conflict  
(b) to expand, in order to identify and resolve the problem of landmines and ERW when 
the currently occupied territories become accessible.   
 
Broad priorities for ANAMA and the national programme were established from the 
beginning as: 
 
• To clear areas of life-threatening dangers 
• To support the resettlement of IDPs through clearance of houses and 
infrastructure required to support communities 
• To clear construction sites as requested by aid and development agencies 
• To support food security through clearance of agricultural and grazing land 
 
Operational criteria for prioritisation/selection of tasks since 2001 include: 
 
• The area must be secure and free of fighting 
• The task must conform to national priorities 
• Refugees or IDPs are returning into the area 
• Reconstruction tasks have to be planned, funded and ready to commence under 
the national reconstruction programme 
• Local authorities and communities must have been consulted 
• The population must derive immediate humanitarian, economic or social 




MINE RISK EDUCATION  
The ICRC, through its work with Azerbaijani IDPs, which began in 1996, was actively 
involved in mine risk education (MRE).  It carried out the following: 
 
• developed a database of mine victims 
• carried out mine awareness sessions in IDP communities 
• trained health and education personnel working there 
 
ANAMA, with the support of UNICEF, took over responsibility for MRE from ICRC at the 
beginning of 2000.  Key ICRC national staff were transferred to ANAMA, as was the 
victim database.  UNICEF worked with ANAMA from 2000-2004, with community 
outreach MRE through volunteer teacher, health workers and others.  Since 2004, as 
the result of an agreement between ANAMA, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education, 
MRE has been integrated in schools as a classroom subject in mine-affected areas.  
ANAMA continues to successfully promote community MRE committees working with 
local authorities to spread MRE materials and monitor local accidents. 
MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
Even though a Mine Victim Assistance Strategy was adopted in 2004, it is more accurate 
to say that there is a range of mine victim assistance (MVA) efforts rather than a 
coherent MVA programme.  Azerbaijan has legislation that guarantees war victims and 
persons with disabilities the right to:  
 
• medical treatment 
• other social support  
• pensions  
 
These laws predate the mine action programme, and were reinforced by the 2009 
ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
Optional Protocol.  The rights and protections under these laws extend to mine victims. 
 
ANAMA established the Mine Victim Assistance Working Group in 2003 to bring 
together local and international NGOs, government agencies and UN organisations 
working on the issue.  In 2004, ANAMA conducted a Mine Victim Assistance Needs 
Assessment, the results of which continue to guide the work of all major MVA actors.  
Most victims received emergency medical and prosthetics support.  Many survey 
respondents, however, identified the lack of support in the areas of social and economic 
reintegration as a problem.   
 
ANAMA’s role in mine victim assistance primarily is to ensure that:  
 
(a) the appropriate range of support is provided to victims, leading to increased focus 




(b) victims and their families are aware of their rights and of the assistance available   
 
In addition, AMAMA supports pilot vocational training and micro-credit projects for 
mine victims and their families.   
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION 
Although Azerbaijan has not committed itself to the destruction of its own stockpiles of 
primarily Soviet era mines, the issue of destruction of abandoned soviet munitions 
stocks is a concern which ANAMA has successfully responded to with the support of 
NATO/NAMSA.  As a result of the success of the Saloglu project (see section 5 below), 
the government has tasked ANAMA (rather than the Ministry of Defence) with a clean-
up of the other ex-Soviet munitions storage areas. 
OTTAWA CONVENTION ADVOCACY 
Azerbaijan is not a signatory of the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention.  It 
has indicated that it will not be able to sign the Convention as long as the conflict with 
Armenia continues, but that it does not foresee any obstacle to sign once that conflict 
has been resolved.  Therefore mine action is an internal safety and development issue 
rather than a treaty obligation.  ANAMA attends the regular working groups and annual 
meetings of the Ottawa Convention as an observer.  It has voted in favour of the annual 
UN General Assembly Resolution against landmines since 2005 and has provided 
voluntary Article 7 reports since 2008.  These reports describe the known problem and 
progress made, but they are incomplete as regards the existence of stockpiles and 
mined areas under the control of the military. 
 
While ANAMA does not have a role in advocacy of the Ottawa Convention, it has an 
active public relations role to make known the dangers and damage caused by 
landmines and ERW to the people and development of Azerbaijan. Since the geographic 
extent of the problem is not nationwide, ANAMA has had to work proactively to ensure 
that government officials and the public as a whole are aware that Azerbaijan has this 
problem. It issues a monthly internet newsletter and press releases to maintain 
awareness of the problem and the programme actions.  It also issues specific press 
releases whenever there is a mine accident or important mine action event.  The news 
items are usually picked up by the local media.   
 
Finally, the “Mine Danger” textbook developed by ANAMA and approved by the 
Ministry of Education in its regular curriculum contains a section on the APMBC and 
notes that high-ranking government officials have repeatedly stated that “the Republic 
of Azerbaijan will discuss the Treaty and adopt the decision to join it as soon as our 
lands are liberated from occupation.” 
RESOURCE MOBILISATION 




some donors (eg USA) preferred to contribute to it directly, and their contribution 
increased significantly when ANAMA assumed responsibility.  Other donors prefer to 
contribute through UNDP, and ANAMA values the trust fund management role which 
UNDP provides, which will become much more important at such time that ANAMA has 
access to work in the currently occupied districts.  Azerbaijan is now the largest single 
contributor to the national mine action programme as well as to the UNDP Trust Fund in 
support of the national programme. 
 
The number of donors has grown from three donors at the beginning of the programme 
to a cumulative total of 17 (Table 3).  Principal partners each contributing more than 
USD 1,000,000 are US Dept of State, European Commission, NATO/NAMSA and UNDP.   
GENDER 
The UN Gender Guidelines for Mine Action were issued after the programme had been 
nationalised.  There are no women deminers.  In 2000, MAG and ANAMA started to 
develop a women’s demining section, and interviewed some candidates, but finally 
decided not to proceed with it.  Relief Azerbaijan employed some women as translators 
during the period of training with MAG.  The LIS survey teams were comprised of both 
men and women, and the community interview process ensured that both men and 
women were consulted.  Some of the vocational training and micro-credit programmes 
focus on women particularly as indirect victims.  ANAMA headquarters staff is 30 per 
cent women, including the heads of two departments. The majority of trained MRE 
facilitators (teachers) are women.  ANAMA maintains and reports mine victim data on a 






HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
In 1996, the Government, in coordination with the World Bank and UNDP, created the 
Azerbaijan Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (ARRA) to oversee reconstruction 
of the areas that had been occupied by the Armenian forces and then recovered by 
Azerbaijan.  During preparatory planning for rehabilitation and return of IDPs to the 
war-affected areas, the Government recognised the need for a programme to remove 
mines/ERW and that such efforts would need international support.  As ARRA began its 
work it encountered landmine obstacles to reconstruction and IDP return that 
confirmed the need for a demining programme.  This founding link of mine action to 
reconstruction, IDP return and development has been maintained ever since. 
 
After Presidential Decree 854 established the National Demining Agency (soon ANAMA), 
Government and UNDP began the negotiation of project AZE/98/003/07 to establish a 
joint “national mine action programme”, to provide technical assistance to the new 
agency and to establish a trust fund to receive financial contributions to support the 
national programme.  The project document (prodoc) was signed on 2 April 1999.  The 
parties recognised the need for international training and material assistance to develop 
the capacity to fulfil the role of ANAMA, with the prodoc stating that “Once fully trained 
and equipped, ANAMA will assume the pivotal role in the field of all mine action 
activities in Azerbaijan.”   
 
ANAMA was to be a mine action coordination body, without its own operational 
capacity.  Clearance was to be conducted by national and international NGOs 
established and accredited for this purpose.  ANAMA was to report to the State 
Commission on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of War-Affected Areas (SCRRA), and 
the Director of ANAMA to be appointed by the Chairman of the SCRRA (Deputy Prime 
Minister), with the agreement of the President and in consultation with UNDP. 
 
From the beginning of the national mine action programme, UNDP was the principal UN 
partner of the government.  UNDP provided the framework for technical and financial 
support following the establishment of the national mine action programme.  UNDP 
cooperation with ANAMA has continued without interruption, and is now under its 
fourth prodoc. 
 
Initial technical assistance to ANAMA was shaped by the period when it began.  ANAMA 
was developed during a period of great a debate in the international mine action 
community concerning:   
 
• standards (IMAS) 
• database system (IMSMA) 
• structure of NMAA and MAC 




• MAC coordination model (not operations - contracting) 
• prioritisation (impact) 
• management development (senior and middle management training) 
 
At the time ANAMA was established, nearly all MACs had been setup and managed by 
the UN, typically as part of a peacekeeping mission, including those in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia and Mozambique.  Even those 
which had been handed over to the national government often still received multiple 
international advisors who were directly involved in day-to-day management of the 
programme.  This meant that nearly all experienced potential international advisors 
understood their role as that of managing the programme, with particular attention to 
field operations.   
 
A new consensus following the 1997 Department of Humanitarian Affairs study on the 
“development of indigenous mine action capacities” highlighted the importance of an 
organisational separation between the programme management capacities of the 
national institution and the operational capacities of its field partners
1
. This was 
reflected in the early decision to establish a national NGO to manage deminers rather 
than have them directly recruited into a division of ANAMA. 
 
While UNDP assistance did not begin with a fully detailed overall capacity development 
strategy, there was a clear understanding in the mine action community as to what 
capabilities a national authority and mine action centre should have.  The UNDP prodoc 
included the development of a mine action plan, comprising six components:   
 
• a national demining agency capable of planning, managing and coordinating 
mine action, undertake resource mobilisation activities, and support in its 
capacity development 
• mine surveys, marking, documentation and creation of a national mines 
database 
• coordinated mine action planning, prioritisation and awareness programmes  
• training, quality management, mine/UXO clearance in support of reconstruction 
programmes 
• victim support activities 
• public relations and advocacy for support of a ban on use of landmines 
 
ANAMA’s original Strategic Plan, adopted in October 2001, focused on development of 
an independent national capacity capable of working with minimal external technical 
advisors by 2003.  Its specific goals addressed the need for capacity in six core areas:  
 









(a) overall management 
(b) demining (clearance and survey) 
(c) MRE  
(d) information management 
(e) training and quality management 
(f) resource mobilisation 
 
Quantitative aspects of the Strategic Plan were revised in November 2003 to consider 
results of the LIS.  Priorities included:  
 
• supporting mechanical demining 
• strengthening strategic planning, management, coordination and control of 
operational activities 
• revising standard operating procedures in accordance with national experience 
and standards   
 
The 2002-2003 Work Plan further emphasised that “The nationalisation of the Program 
will remain a main goal to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for outside 
technical support.” 
 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION  
The first ANAMA staff were recruited in May 1999 and the first international advisors 
arrived in mid-summer.  By March 2000, ANAMA had:  
 
• developed a national mine action plan 
• initiated a national mine database 
• constructed administrative buildings 
• selected training areas  
• begun to purchase equipment   
 
The UNDP-Government project signed on 2 April 1999 named UNOPS as the 
cooperating agency for the recruitment of international advisors and procurement of 
demining services.  Early efforts of the Chief Technical Advisor and the Regional Advisor 
focused on  
 
(a) setting up a regional base in Fizuli district, the highly impacted district where 
operations were to begin 
(b) procurement of equipment for the yet to be created operational demining 
teams 
(c) writing National Mine Action Standards derived from the International Mine 




(d) selecting a national NGO (Relief Azerbaijan) to manage the training of the 
demining teams 
 
Following the existing model, the technical advisors supplied by UNOPS were in 
operations, information management, and programme management; ANAMA proved 
strong in all these areas.  UNOPS provided four full time advisors:  Chief Technical 
Advisor, Regional Operations Advisor, Quality Assurance (QA) Advisor and Information 
Systems Advisor.  The QA advisor was mobilied as a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) 
and the information systems advisor was provided on an in-kind basis by the 
Government of Switzerland, which had supported development of special information 
management software for mine action.   
 
ANAMA received 12 long term advisors through UNOPS over the following five years, 
with an equal or greater number of other international advisors supplied by contractors 
and other donors.  UNICEF supported the development of MRE materials and outreach 
training.  Each advisory role was important in setting up ANAMA, and each was phased 
out as it became less necessary.  The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) position was 
maintained longest and was finally phased out in 2004. 
 
UNOPS contracted with Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to train deminers, section leaders 
and site supervisors and develop the capacity of the national NGO to manage the 
demining teams.  MAG began working on this in March 2000 and deployed the first four 
sections (27 deminers in total) by June.  By the beginning of 2001, MAG trained four 
national section leaders from the deminers, but insisted that it needed to maintain 
more experienced international staff as site supervisors.  This was an issue of concern to 
the new National Director when he arrived in April 2001, since it implied postponing 
nationalisation of the programme.  MAG concluded its UNOPS contract at the end of 
2001 without having trained supervisors.   
 
UNOPS contracted Minetech in 2000 to bring a mine detecting dog (MDD) capacity to 
the programme to work in coordination with the NGO deminers.  ANAMA decided that 
it wanted to incorporate such capacity in its toolbox.  However, Minetech had not been 
contracted to train handlers and departed with its dogs at the end of the contract.  The 
US Department of State then agreed to provide MDD assistance and contracted Ronco 
to bring dogs and trainers to Azerbaijan, giving ANAMA an MDD capacity which it has 
maintained and expanded since 2002. 
 
Over the years ANAMA received technical assistance in several areas essential to 
develop the identified required capacities (Chart 2). 
 
Chart 2 
Technical Cooperation Partners and Subject Matter 




UNDP General partner, management support, TAs, trust fund 
management, senior and middle management training support, 
exchange of experience with other programmes, development of 
regional centre 
UNOPS Cooperating agency for technical advisors, contracting with service 
providers, contracting ANAMA to provide its own staff 
UNICEF MRE 
UNMAS UN assessment mission, LIS Quality Assurance Monitor 
GICHD IMSMA, technical advice regarding legislation, dogs, machines 
US Dept of State Financial support, MDD training 
US DoD, 
EUCOM 
Equipment, training for EOD, demining, munitions storage disposal 
MAG Training of manual demining NGOs, contracted by UNOPS 
World Bank Loan funds for construction of ANAMA HQ and vehicle 
procurement 
Switzerland Advisors for IMSMA, financial support 
Minetech MDD capacity, contracted by UNOPS 
Ronco MDD and handler training, contracted by US DoS 
Armor Group MDM support 
SAC Landmine Impact Survey 




Senior and middle management training 
James Madison 
University 
Senior management training 
 
The two demining NGOs provide management and support for the manual demining 
teams, which operate within a framework established by ANAMA.  ANAMA assigns the 
38-person demining team their areas of operation and tasks.  They have the same 
ANAMA-provided training, same SOPs, same salary scales, uniforms and work rules, and 
even the same menus for meals.   
 
Relief Azerbaijan began with 27 deminers in 2000 and increased to the originally 
planned 38 in 2002.  IEPF, which initially conducted surveys, started with 38 deminers in 
2002.  ANAMA staff were trained by a US Department of Defense mission as deminers, 
emergency response, UXO and technical survey in 2002, and were conducting clearance 
by 2003.  In 2004, the three organisations together had 107 deminers and 15 mine 
detecting dogs (MDD).  By 2011, this had increased to 114 deminers and 36 MDD. 
 
In 2003, ANAMA decided that it required mechanical demining machine capacity 
(MDM), and arranged with the US Department of State and the European Commission 





ESTIMATING THE SCALE OF THE LANDMINE/ERW PROBLEM 
The need for good survey data to understand the extent of the landmine/ERW problem 
was recognised in the World Bank project formulation reports.  In 1998, BACTEC 
International undertook a Level 1 Survey in Fizuli and Agdam districts.  The team 
surveyed 260 of the 700 square kilometres potentially mined in the Fizuli district, and 
marked 3.2 square kilometres.  In addition, 17 sites in Agdam were surveyed.  The 
landmine problem in Fizuli was concentrated around 16 villages, as well as roads, 
irrigation channels and power lines. 
 
ANAMA recognised early the importance of good information regarding the extent of 
contamination.  The 2001 General Survey identified a total of 60 square kilometres of 
contamination affecting 64 communities in 11 districts on the line of control.  SAC 
conducted a LIS in 18 districts from September 2002 to June 2003, with IEPF as its 
operational partner.  This resulted in an increase in the estimated hazardous area to 736 
square kilometres.   
 
These surveys provided the information upon which the national programme was built.  
The LIS expanded ANAMA’s perspective on the mine/ERW contamination problem in 
terms of the number of districts affected and the extent of explosive ordnance left 
behind at ex-Soviet military bases.  This provided the basis for the expansion of the 
demining programme and development of a special cleanup project for the Saloglu arms 
depot which began with NATO support in 2005.   
 
ANAMA decided that it needed to improve database information as the programme 
progressed.  In 2006, it conducted a review with the local authorities starting from the 
LIS results, which reduced the estimate of SHAs to 306 square kilometres, a reduction of 
60 per cent (Table 4).  Experience gained by then led ANAMA to conclude that only 
about ten per cent of the remaining area would actually require clearance, while the 
rest would be cancelled through survey on a case by case basis. ANAMA initiated a 
resurvey process in 2008.  Continuing survey and clearance reduced the overall SHA to 
184 square kilometres as of the end of 2009, comprising 280 SHAs, of which 89 were 
believed to be mined areas and 191 with only UXO.   
MINE RISK EDUCATION 
MRE was supported by UNICEF from 2000 until 2007.  During the first years, the MRE 
programme expanded through: 
 
• group training sessions 
• community billboards 
• voluntary training of teachers and health workers 
 
LIS found that the most common MRE outreach known to community members were 




positive, but questioned the focus on school age children, since the majority of mine 
victims were working age men.   
 
In 2004, following a change of personnel, the Ministry of Education (MoE), signed a 
memorandum of understanding with UNICEF and ANAMA, to incorporate MRE into the 
regular course curriculum for schools in the affected districts.  Once the agreement was 
signed, the parties implemented it very effectively.  ANAMA/UNICEF developed 
materials to MoE pedagogic standards, UNICEF printed textbooks, the MoE directed its 
teachers as to how to incorporate MRE into their weekly lesson plans and ANAMA 
trained 2,355 teachers in the subject matter (Table 5).  ANAMA’s work with the MoE 
continues strongly at the time of this study in 2011. 
MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
In 2000, Azerbaijan had two principal prosthetics hospitals, both in Baku, one of which 
was run in cooperation with the ICRC.  The latter hospital closed at the end of 2001.  










When the Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme was established, there was a need for 
capacity development in all areas.  The original need for capacity development was 
resolved during the first five years of the programme.  Various external evaluations have 
commended the quality of work carried out by ANAMA and its national NGO partners.  
These include external evaluations for UNICEF, the World Bank and UNDP: 
 
• Evaluation of the UNICEF-ANAMA MRE programme in 2002 recognised that the 
effort had produced a “good national capacity.”  In 2004, the MRE programme 
transitioned to full national responsibility as the Ministry of Education assumed 
responsibility for implementation and monitoring of MRE in the school curriculum, 
and district authorities coordinated volunteer community-based MRE committees. 
 
• The “outcome evaluation” of UNDP assistance to ANAMA in 2004 concluded that 
the joint UNDP-Government “Azerbaijan Mine Action Programme has proved to be a 
success. (…) ANAMA has provided evidence that effective institutional capacity 
building is possible.” 
 
• The World Bank assessment in 2005 concluded that ANAMA has become “an 
efficiently structured and well-functioning organisation operating in accordance 
with international standards for demining activities.”   
 
• The 2008 “outcome evaluation” of UNDP support to mine action since 1999 
concluded:  “The mine action programme is highly integrated with all aspects being 
coordinated by ANAMA.  The ‘hard issues’ of mine clearance and unexploded 
ordnance disposal (EOD) are well managed and targeted.  The ‘soft issues’ of mine 
risk education (MRE) and victim assistance area also well managed.” 
 
• UNDP 2009 study of “feasibility of ANAMA establishing an International Centre for 
Mine Action” concluded that ANAMA “has grown into a mature, well-managed and 
technically competent mine action organization.”  ANAMA “has a well-resourced 
and international standard training capability” and “has played a key role in 
developing the mine action capacity of several neighbouring countries.” 
 
• GICHD 2009 evaluation of EC funded mine action in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
concluded that:  “Azerbaijan has a well established mine action sector. The 
Azerbaijan National Mine Action Authority (ANAMA) is responsible for planning, 
coordinating, managing and monitoring of mine action countrywide. While it was 




it has a sound structure and is very active, not just in its duties in Azerbaijan, but 
also in regional or international mine action events…Capacity building has been 
successful.” 
 
NATIONAL PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
The national programme management was created with the programme.  The first 
national director of ANAMA had an often difficult relationship with the early 
international advisors, caused in part by differing perceptions of their respective roles, 
including the sense that the advisors were interfering in his management 
responsibilities.  The issue came to the attention of the senior most government officials 
and the current national director was appointed in April 2001.  An experienced and 
well-respected manager from the state construction sector, he entered with a mandate 
to resolve the problems and nationalise the programme.  He has decisively developed 
the organisation and is well-respected both inside of it and out.  While the initial seeds 
for the national capacity were planted in 2000, it was only with the arrival of the second 
national irector that ANAMA began to be guided by a clear capacity development 
strategy. 
 
Most of the middle and senior managers have participated in one or more of the 
international manager training courses provided at Cranfield University (UK), James 
Madison University (USA) or Amman University (Jordan).  They speak highly of the 
courses and of the value created by the fact that their colleagues have had similar 
training, giving them a shared understanding from which to approach organisational 
issues. 
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES 
The specific structure of the national demining centre was new and the initial 
organisational chart was taken from the experience of other countries.  The original 
organisational structure was staffed more like a project than an on-going government 
office, with a total of 18 national staff from all levels (see Annex C).  Once the centre 
was established with general management, finance, support and information 
management, national management determined there was a need for specialised 
subunits to strengthen certain functions.  That resulted in the current organisational 
structure:   
 
 Departments:  Operations, MRE, Information, Planning and 
Development, Finance and Support Services 
 Division:  Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division (TSQAD) 
 Offices:  Information Technology, Public Relations, Executive 
Secretariat 
 





 Head office – Baku 
 Regional office – Fizuli, from first year 
 Regional training centre – Goygol  
 Three operational centres – Terter, Agjabedi and Aghstafa districts 
 Field operations in seven districts 
TECHNICAL CAPACITIES 
While the specific core technical capacities were new for Azerbaijan, ANAMA had the 
advantage of catching up with known practice elsewhere.  Therefore, the standards, 
methods and training for manual clearance, MDD, MDM and IMSMA were all initially 
imported through advisors.  Once this had been done and practical experience was 
gained, ANAMA’s expansion was based on national decisions and training.   
 
Technical advisors and trainers helped establish the standards, operational procedures, 
information management system and strategic planning that were standard for mine 
action programmes at the time that ANAMA was developing.  With the relatively high 
level of education that was common throughout the Soviet Union, and the opportunity 
of an important new challenge, national staff responded quickly to the new approach.  
As the programme moved toward full nationalisation and staff gained more experience, 
the SOPs were adapted to national systems and procedures, a process which was lead 
by the national staff.  Further development of appropriate SOPs has taken place since, 
specifically for land release and ammunition stores clearance. 
 
IEPF and RA continue to focus primarily on minefield clearance (and MRE), while 
ANAMA focuses on battle area clearance, UXO destruction and emergency response to 
spot tasks, as well as MDD and MDM support to the manual demining teams of all three 
organisations.  At the end of 2010, ANAMA had a total of 404 employees: 253 
operational staff and 151 administrative support staff.  IEPF and RA each had 38 
deminers and a combined total of 137 staff (Chart 3). 
 
Chart 3 
Mine Action Programme Operational Capacity, 2011 
Manual clearance capacity 116 deminers, 3 organisations 
Technical survey capacity 20 surveyors 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal capacity 79 specialists 
Emergency response team 18 deminers 
Training, survey and quality assurance division 20 instructors/inspectors 
Mine detecting dog capacity 32 dogs, 42 dog handlers 
Mechanical demining machines 6 (Bozena-4, Bozena-5, MV-4 and EOD-BOT) 
MDM personnel 18 operators and support 
Support personnel 228 (logistics, inventory, procurement, maintenance) 





The various land release efforts have considerably lessened the extent of landmine 
impact in the accessible regions, compared to the situation at the time of the Landmine 
Impact Survey.  This leapt forward with the 2006 review with local authorities of the LIS-
identified SHAs (Table 6), and has continued with average annual release of 30 square 
kilometres since 2008.  
STRATEGIC PLANNING 
The current national socio-economic development plan 2009-2013 follows the previous 
national plan in identifying ANAMA as responsible for: 
 
• Reducing the number of deaths and injuries from mine incidents 
• Promoting the return of IDPs 
• Facilitating rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure; and 
• Supporting food security 
 
The mine action strategy for 2009-2013 seeks to: 
 
• reduce and clear accessible suspected hazardous areas 
• develop and expand operational capacity 
• support intensified and extended MRE and VA programmes   
 
In the long term, ANAMA plans to further increase and reinforce its operational and 
management capacity to enable it to address the mine and ERW threat from the 
occupied areas once they are returned to Azerbaijan.   
 
Ever since the first national strategy, adopted in 2001, ANAMA has had a dual 
perspective on the national programme:  resolving the landmine and ERW problems of 
the currently accessible territories and eventually assessing and resolving the landmine 
and ERW problems of the occupied territories.  ANAMA has a plan for clearance of the 
currently occupied territories once they are returned.  On the basis of preliminary 
estimations, they expect to establish seven bases, with a total of 700 deminers, 100 
dogs and 26 machines, to work over a decade to ensure that the areas are free from the 
threat of mines (Tables 7 and 8).  ANAMA therefore seeks to maintain capacity until the 
other territories become accessible, and then expand, rather than plan for programme 
conclusion. 
 
There are an estimated three to five years of demining remaining in the currently 
accessible areas, as well as response to spot tasks, to provide continuing value and 
experience.  One reason that ANAMA has entered into contracts and cooperation 
agreements with other countries is to ensure that its full structure remains 





ANAMA and the national mine action programme have been organisationally 
sustainable for several years.  They value interaction with other programmes – and 
would like more such interaction. The National Director and staff currently manage the 
programme and adapt its structure and operations to changing circumstances according 
to their own criteria.   
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Financial sustainability is assured by the high level of government contribution to the 
programme budget – which increased steadily from ten per cent to over 75 per cent of 
the annual budget (Table 9).  This contribution is supported by the inclusion of ANAMA 
since 2006 in the multiyear National Socio-economic Development Plan and its explicit 
inclusion in the annual state budget. 
EXTENDING TECHNICAL COOPERATION TO OTHER NATIONAL MINE 
ACTION PROGRAMMES 
ANAMA has signed several memoranda of cooperation and agreements, including with 
the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, Croatia 
MAC, Turkey Ministry of Defence Industry, Government of Georgia MAC, and the 
Afghanistan DMC. 
 
The strength of ANAMA is evidenced by its ability to provide support directly to foreign 
clients and partners, including the national programmes of Afghanistan, Croatia, 
Georgia, Jordan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Vietnam.  These cooperation efforts build on 
ANAMA’s own experience in mine action – the first and still most experienced national 
programme within the region – together with the language facility provided by Azeri 
(very similar to Turkish) and Russian as working languages.  ANAMA has also conducted 
training through translators in Arabic, Farsi, Dari, and Georgian.  Major projects include:  
 
• Georgia – In 2009 ANAMA submitted a proposal in a NATO/NAMSA competitive 
tender process to provide operational and capacity development training to help 
establish the new Georgia National Army entity responsible for mine action.  In 
spite of not being a NATO member, ANAMA won the contract.  ANAMA supplied 
its own equipment for the training, while procurement was underway for the 
Georgian teams.  Training has since been conducted in Georgia and Azerbaijan, 
with nine two-week sessions covering a range of core topics 
 
• Turkey – ANAMA has conducted two projects with Turkey.  In the first project, 
funded by the Government of Turkey, ANAMA provided demining training to 
NOKTA Ltd.  For the second project, ANAMA has joined with a successful Turkish 
consortium to provide training and quality assurance of Turkish deminers 





• Afghanistan – the Government of Azerbaijan provided non-military assistance to 
the Government of Afghanistan on a bilateral basis and included ANAMA in the 
formulation team.  ANAMA’s counterpart for this assistance is the government 
body Department for Mine Clearance (DMC), the local counterpart for eventual 
handover of the Afghanistan national programme.  ANAMA has hosted DMC 
staff for several trainings, supported adaptation, translation and printing of the 
MRE text book from Azeri to Dari and Pashto, and has discussed other specific 
topics of cooperation.  Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
also visited ANAMA and has been pleased with the results of the ANAMA-DMC 
cooperation.  ANAMA and MACCA have very good relations and experience with 
the exchange.  MACCA appreciates the support of ANAMA to DMC on 
government issues. ANAMA also has assisted DMC to prepare to take over 
responsibilities from MACCA 
MINE RISK EDUCATION 
MRE continues to be provided in several distinct manners for different populations: 
 
• Incorporated by the MoE in the regular curriculum for schools in war-affected 
districts.  MoE supervises MRE instruction in over 1000 schools as part of 
teachers’ normal workload, reaching a wide population 
• Deminers provide MRE to local communities whenever work is interrupted by 
weather 
• ANAMA issues press releases and related cautionary messages whenever there 
is a mine accident 
• Community MRE Committees monitor accidents and keep interested actors 
informed 
MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE 
Mine Victim Assistance is coordinated by the ANAMA Information Department, within 
the framework of the 2004 Mine Victim Assistance Strategy, based on the 2004 Mine 
Victim Needs Assessment.  ANAMA tries to ensure that mine victims are aware of their 
rights to treatment and support under national laws and to coordinate economic 
reintegration projects targeting mine victims.  Specific projects have included: 
 
• “Community-based small business trainings and micro-credit fund for Azerbaijan 
mine survivors.”  The second phase began in 2010 and will directly benefit 73 
mine survivor participants, similar to the number of participants in the first 
phase 
• “Medical examination and treatment procedures in Sanatorium” provided 110 
mine victims with full medical services during a three week stay at a Caspian Sea 
sanatorium 
• Wheelchair distribution 





Mine Risk Education 
 
MRE experts have long recognised the importance of working with schools.  An important 
achievement of the UNICEF-supported programme from 2000-2002 was the training by 15 
UNICEF-qualified “master teachers” of 1,043 teachers and 508 health workers to educate 
children and clients about MRE.  The teachers and health workers were volunteers, and while 
the results were positive they were superficial.  UNICEF and ANAMA tried unsuccessfully to get 
the programme adopted into the curriculum of the Ministry of Education.   
 
In 2004, with a change in personnel in the Ministry of Education, agreement was reached and a 
memorandum of understanding was signed by the Ministry of Education, UNICEF and ANAMA 
to integrate MRE into the curriculum of schools in the mine-affected areas.  A joint pedagogic 
committee developed the materials to provide appropriate content and approved text books.  
The Ministry included “mine risk education” as a one semester subject, with an appropriate 
teaching plan.  UNICEF paid for printing of materials and, between 2004 and 2009, ANAMA 
conducted teacher training for all schools covered by the agreement (Table 5).  The teachers 
cover the material as part of their regular teaching schedule.   
 
The value of the teacher time involved is estimated to be equivalent to an annual financial 
contribution of roughly USD 400,000, while being more effectively institutionalised than ANAMA 
could ever do on its own.  The programme appears to be quite effective - since 2010, there have 
been no accidents involving school age children living in the affected districts and no fatalities 







TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
In many of the countries with mine action programmes at the time ANAMA was 
created, the state structure had collapsed or been severely weakened.  However, this 
was not the case in Azerbaijan.  Government offices needed to be re-established in the 
accessible areas affected by the conflict, but national institutions and structures had 
continued to function.   
 
There was never a question of transitioning a programme from the UN to national 
ownership, since the programme was nationally owned in the first place.  The Azeri 
perspective focused on the need to import knowledge related to the new field of mine 
action, and resources to jumpstart the process, but did not foresee an extended UN 
presence within the national agency.  It was an issue of practical capacity and 
management control, while welcoming continued support by the UN and other 
partners. 
 
ANAMA had multiple UN advisors, both resident and visiting, and these advisors played 
a strong role in the establishment and management of ANAMA during its early years. 
International advisors were key in obtaining some necessary knowledge, but national 
staff found that working with them was not always easy. Their role was viewed locally 
as generally positive on the technical side while sometimes clumsy and inappropriate as 
management and in personal behaviour.   
 
Those who worked directly with UN advisors provide a positive assessment of most of 
them, but it is often balanced by critical comments.  Each advisor seemed concerned 
with different problems and had  their own solutions, so continuity of advice and 
development was lacking.  As ANAMA matured, ANAMA staff sometimes had more 
experience than some UN advisors. The cost of the advisors, which seemed high, 
exacerbated tensions. The monthly salary of one advisor was the same as the combined 
monthly salaries of one entire NGO demining team. The experience with international 
advisors left behind particularly negative memories in those few cases where the 
personal behaviour of the advisor was seen as disrespectful or otherwise inappropriate. 
There is no true privacy in such situations, so any inappropriate behaviour becomes 
widely known, reducing the credibility and effectiveness of the advisor concerned. 
 
International advisors (both individuals and contractor staff) rarely spoke Russian or 
Azeri and had to do some or all of their work with national staff through translators.  
Interestingly, this produced a core of ANAMA staff who were college educated in law, 
business or other subjects, and able to interact effectively between advisors and other 
national staff. Over time several of these individuals took on key roles in senior and 






The successful “mine action transition” in Azerbaijan tells a story of how specific 
technical and management capacities developed.  It also shows how all positions and 
the effective institutionalisation of mine action was nationalised, thanks to a strong 
manager who lead qualified and motivated staff with government and international 
financial and political support.   
 
The decision to move ahead decisively with nationalisation came with the arrival of the 
new National Director in April 2001.  He had been requested to come to ANAMA for two 
years to “straighten it out.”  From the very beginning, he charged the national staff to 
become ready to fully manage the programme, since the “advisors will not always be 
here.”   
 
Among his early actions was the establishment of a national training and monitoring 
team. Quality assurance and training had, until then, only been done by international 
advisors, but from then on it was to be done by nationals with the support of advisors. 
Similarly, he met with the acting CTA and UNDP to affirm this intent and clarify their 
respective roles and authorities to ensure the cooperation would lead to full 
nationalisation within a reasonable period of time. The new CTA, who arrived in August 
2001, fully supported this.   
 
The first national strategy, adopted in October 2001, set the goal for ANAMA to manage 
most mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal 
outside technical support.  The programme was formally nationalised in 2004, with the 
departure of the last CTA, who at that point was the only remaining long term advisor. 
The target in the national strategy proved to be realistic, even though the process took 
a little longer than planned to complete. 
 
ANAMA self assessment in late 2002:  “The aim of the agency for consolidation of 
nationalisation and expansion of capacity has been mainly achieved.  (…)  ANAMA has 
established a functional headquarters staffed with qualified nationals, a regional office and a 
training facility that meet international standards. Currently two national NGOs and two 
international organisations are working under the framework of ANAMA. The UNDP is assisting 
ANAMA with resource mobilisation and provides technical support to the Project.  At the same 
time the Agency is developing bilateral relations with the donor community.” 
 
The CTA who arrived in mid-2001 was the first mine action CTA anywhere to be selected 
from a mine-affected country.  His background in mine action from the perspective of a 
national NGO provided a practical perspective that shared the goal to move ahead with 
nationalisation. He encouraged gathering experience from other programmes and 
encouraged national staff to express their opinions on how work could be improved.   
 
The National Director and the CTA worked together well, and ANAMA staff remember 
this period as a very productive one, when they began having more training and 




actual practice to nationalise the SOPs and reinforce knowledge about them.  When 
questions arose about alternatives, they tried them out and reported back to the 
technical working group for a decision.  Both the director and the CTA recognised the 
value of work in the field. They acted to overcome the existing gaps between 
headquarters and the field and between ANAMA and the NGOs, and insisted that all are 
important parts of a unified programme where success depends on the work of each 
one. 
ESSENTIAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME CAPACITIES 
What are the essential capacities required of a typical mine action programme?  Based on 
accumulated experience of existing mine action programmes, they can be summarised as 
follows (Chart 4): 
 
Chart 4 
Essential capacities of a mine action programme 
 
Organisational capacities of the MAC 
- Overall management 
- Operational management (planning, tasking, monitoring, quality management  
- Information management 
- Administrative management 
-  
Operational capacities of the national programme 
- Demining assets (manual, MDD, MDM) 
- Field presence 
- Mine risk education 
- Mine victim assistance 
 
Authority and responsibility 
- National demining law 
- National institutional and budget integration to provide appropriate sustainable authority  
 
Interaction with and provision of support to clients (eg government departments and private 
companies whose work programmes are constrained by explosives contamination)  
- Public access to information on known contamination, suspected areas and demining 
conducted  
- Survey teams made available to check specific areas of concern and estimate costs of action  
 
The establishment of the training and monitoring team in 2001 was an important step 
in: 
 
• nationalising the technical and management capacity 
• providing ANAMA with its own resource to refresh 





With ten years of experience, the Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division has 
delivered a wide range of training courses to cover ANAMA needs (Chart 5).   
 
Chart 5 
Training courses provided  






Integration for Joint Operations with MDDs 
Integration for Joint Operations with MDMs 
Instructor 
Middle and Field Management 











Storage and Transportation of Explosives 
MRE Instructor 
 
Capacity development in the specific areas typical of a mine action programme was 
sufficient to develop the capacity of the national programme.  Key steps in the 
development and nationalisation of specific capacities of the national mine action 
programme included (Chart 6): 
 
Chart 6 
Key Steps in the development of the Azerbaijan National Mine Action Programme 
 
- Hazard area information collection: general survey, LIS, review, technical survey, resurvey 
- Database installation and training 
- Demining teams trained and established 
- NGOs selected and prepared to administer and support demining team 
- Fizuli regional office and operational base opened 
- Training, monitoring and QA team established 
- National site supervisors assumed responsibility 
- Management training courses: senior and middle management 




- MDM machines selected and national operators trained 
- Mine Victim Needs Assessment of 2004 
- MRE in school curriculum agreed with Ministry of Education in 2004 
- ANAMA included in national socio-economic development plan from 2006 
- ANAMA included in annual national budget from 2006, with national contribution steadily 
increasing to 75 per cent of total ANAMA costs 
- Successful implementation of high profile projects:  Saloglu, BTC pipeline, Zobjug settlement 
- Direct support to other national mine action programmes 
- Demining law to regulate future expanded programme (pending approval) 
 
The revision of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) required that ANAMA staff 
accumulate experience to be able to review and improve them. Original SOPs prepared 
in 2000 were transplanted from another UN programme to Azerbaijan; they were not 
adapted to the situation or practice of Azerbaijan.  Eventually, after accumulating more 
experience, the 2003 review was undertaken by the team of site supervisors, with short 
term advisory support, resulting in a set of SOPs that were much more relevant to 
Azerbaijan. 
 
ANAMA gained confidence in its own abilities and developed a very positive profile with 
key national and international partners through its successful completion of several high 
profile projects.  These included:  
 
(a) clearance of the abandoned Saloglu ammunition storage area 
(b) ensuring a safe route for the BTC petroleum pipeline 




High Profile Project #1:  Saloglu ammunitions storage area  
 
The Soviet Union’s largest ammunition storage area in the South Caucasus was located near the 
town of Saloglu in Aghstafa district. An area made up of 138 bunkers had been developed since 
the 1930s.  As Soviet troops withdrew from Azerbaijan, they sought to destroy the bunkers and 
munitions with a series of explosions in August 1991.  This produced a dense presence of UXO 
over the 5.6 km
2  
storage area, and scattered UXO over an area of 44 km
2
.  In the years that 
followed, the explosive debris resulted in 152 UXO accidents, of which 32 were fatal. The 
problem was identified by the general survey of 2001 and highlighted by the Landmine Impact 
Survey of 2002-2003.   
 
In late 2001 the Government of Azerbaijan appealed to NATO for support in clearance of the 
Saloglu site within the Partnership for Peace programme.  NATO/NAMSA initially considered 
providing support to the Azerbaijan National Army (ANA) to conduct the work.  After review of 
ANA and ANAMA capacity and procedures, NATO/NAMSA decided to support ANAMA to 
conduct the clearance.  From late 2005 to mid-2011, through three project phases (surface, 






core area and many scattered UXO in the wider area.  A total of over 640,000 UXO were 





High Profile Project #2:  BTC pipeline  
 
Construction of the BP Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline to carry petroleum overland from the 
Caspian Sea for ship-loading on the Mediterranean was perhaps the single most important 
investment in the region during the first decade of the new century.  The pipeline route had 
been chosen without much attention to the potential hazard represented by passing within 250 
metres of the Saloglu ammunition storage site, although the Army had been requested to clear 
any hazards that might exist along the pipeline route. As the contractor approached the area 
they discovered that there were indeed UXO in the immediate path of construction.   
 
BP was dissatisfied with the lack of thoroughness of the previously conducted clearance work 
and the government asked ANAMA to handle it.  ANAMA set up a special team to work with the 
BTC contractor on the 22 km hazardous stretch.  It removed 121 UXO from a 60 metre wide 
corridor and the pipeline construction proceeded without delay.  This project strengthened the 
reputation of ANAMA as a capable professional organisation that could be relied upon to 




High Profile Project #3:  Zobjug IDP resettlement clearance and land release innovations 
 
Faced with demand for more rapid demining of land for critical IDP resettlement projects, 
ANAMA was an early experimenter in what has come to be known as “land release”.  In 2004 
the president announced that all IDPs who wanted to return to villages in the liberated 
territories would be housed within three years.  ANAMA was able to guide the Social Fund for 
IDPs to build in areas free of suspected hazard.  But it was impossible to find a hazard-free site 
large enough for one group of 2,104 families from several villages in Fizuli district. Existing 
methods were not able to clear and handover the land for construction within the deadline.   
 
ANAMA developed a more deliberate land release approach (the term was not yet in general 
use), permitting it to assess the suspected hazard levels of different  areas, based on existing 
information, and apply different methods accordingly. This resulted in reducing the time and 
cost for carefully processing the entire area to about one-third of what it would otherwise have 
been.  A total of 19 km
2   
were released through survey and clearance, and the IDPs were able to 
move in on time. The SOP for this new land release approach was adopted in 2007 and has 
increased the level of productivity of the programme as a whole. 
 
 





The full nationalisation of a mine action programme is sometimes thought of as 
appropriate only when the national landmine/ERW problem has been largely resolved, 
in which case identifying and responding to the “residual problem” takes on particular 
importance.  The transition in the case of Azerbaijan came much earlier, and the 
experience suggests that this could be possible with many programmes. 
 
ANAMA has responded successfully to a set of issues often faced by mature 




Issues regularly faced by mature mine action programmes 
 
- The development of high-level capacities for planning, management and coordination 
- Sustaining the programme, including local ownership and financing capacity (external 
resource mobilisation and national financing)  
- Good governance of the programme, including accountability, transparency, equal 
opportunities and responsiveness  
- Planning for handling of residual capacity 
- Arranging for long term management of dataset, so that future planning projects will know 
what areas were suspect and what areas were demined 
- Remaining well integrated in the international mine action community network  
- Linking mine action and development 
-  
 
ANAMA has developed specific units for planning and resource mobilisation and they 
have proven successful.  Long term sustainability of the programme is ensured not just 
by its good reputation, but specifically by its incorporation into the national socio-
economic plan and national budget.   
 
ANAMA has sought to ensure its accountability to stakeholders, and transparency in its 
action, through regular reporting (monthly, quarterly, each semester, annually) to all 
concerned, together with annual audits of all its funding, and a separate audit of funds 
received through UNDP.  Furthermore, all salary and other payments to staff are made 
through electronic banking, which provides a clear record of transfers and minimises 
doubts that are often created in a system based on cash payments. 
 
ANAMA recognises that spot contamination that was not previously known will 
continue to appear for many decades. When it occurs now, the police are instructed to 
secure the immediate area and they can rely on a prompt response from small ANAMA 
emergency response teams. ANAMA sees no reason to change this approach while it is 
still operating at full capacity. This relates to a somewhat unusual aspect of the ANAMA 
situation, driven by a second type of “residual contamination” in currently occupied 




opportunity to expand when those areas are returned.  Therefore, ANAMA wants to 
keep existing work and even seeks new work to allow it to maintain its structure. This is 
an unusual “transition” issue, with which current ANAMA management is dealing. 
 
The national mine action database will remain an important planning and 
environmental hazard dataset far into the future.  It contains critically important 
information about what areas were suspected of being hazardous, which were 
demined, and how they were treated (through clearance or survey).  This information 
will be as important for future construction and development planning as good data on 
soil types, seismic risks, flood plains, industrial contamination and other environmental 
hazards.  It is important that the database be housed in an appropriate institution and 
relies on accessible software.  Since ANAMA will be around for many more years, it is 
not urgent to resolve this issue now, but it would be useful to discuss it with the 
appropriate national partner institution. 
 
ANAMA has not required technical support for many years, but it benefits from 
technical exchange with other programmes when opportunities arise. Ironically, 
ANAMA’s successful ownership and management of the national programme may have 
removed it somewhat from the discussions within the international mine action 
community, which are often mediated through chief technical advisors, who, along with 
technical advisors, help maintain a flow of information about developments of interest 
to the mine action community. Without their presence, it becomes more important that 
ANAMA actively pursues the contacts to remain integrated into those discussions.  This 
is not just a matter of updating email lists, but of proactively engaging in the relevant 
discussions and visiting other programmes to share innovative experience.   
 
Learning about and trying new approaches will help ANAMA to be ready to be more 
effective when the currently occupied territories become accessible.  If both ANAMA 
and the relevant international organisations (particularly the GICHD and UNDP, but also 
UNICEF, UNMAS and others) recognise this, they can be more proactive to ensure that 
ANAMA staff are aware of and participate in the range of international mine action 
opportunities.  ANAMA would benefit from programme visits to observe and explore 




Topics for learning from other programmes, for potential future development 
 
- Cluster munitions clearance 
- Use of rats for demining 
- Ground penetrating radar – road verification 
- Ground penetrating radar – other purposes 
- Mountainside clearance 




- Lessons from evaluations 
- Land release experience 
 
ANAMA’s work has been closely linked with development since it was initially created to 
support the reconstruction effort in the war-affected regions.  Since 2006, it is directly 
referenced in the national socio-economic development plan for support to 
development actions.  Its national budget allocations provides coverage for priority 
development programmes, and it can be called upon by public and private entities to 
provide support outside that framework, upon approval of an appropriate project 
including relevant costs. 
 
A national demining law was drafted by the advisors in 2002 but never submitted for 
approval.  ANAMA did not believe that approval of the law was important at that time.  
ANAMA is now interested in having a national law approved, in anticipation of increased 
activity with additional actors, when the currently occupied territories become 
accessible. Issues which until now have been dealt with internally or through direct 
coordination between ANAMA and the two national NGOs may benefit from an explicit 
legal framework in the future, when the national programme expands and new partners 
join.  This includes such questions as ANAMA authority within the programme, 
organisational accreditation, labour conditions, etc.  The law currently awaiting approval 
would also formalise the position of ANAMA as part of the state structure, with 
attendant civil service security for its staff. 
 
ANAMA has the appropriate types of capacities for its work today.  If it had greater 
demining assets, it could further reduce existing SHAs through survey (enabling 
cancelled areas to be put back into use) and conclude more rapidly the clearance and 
handover of confirmed hazardous areas.  ANAMA does not currently consider there to 
be a need to establish a residual response capacity since it foresees more than another 
decade of mine action programme activity.  None of this appears to represent a 
bottleneck in the ability of any other parties to proceed with their projects. 
 
The primary future development of national capacity will be quantitative expansion.  
This will occur at the time when resolution of the current conflict permits mine action 
activities in the currently occupied territories.  Until that time, ANAMA will seek to 
continue activities at the present scale and maintain capabilities ready for rapid 
expansion when the time comes to do so.  This is also an appropriate period to explore 






Several important lessons can be drawn from the Azerbaijan experience, lessons which 
are relevant for other national programme managers and for international organisations 
working in mine action.  They are discussed below in four broad topics:  concept, 
process, content and post-transition issues. 
 
“TRANSITION” CONCEPT 
The transition debate in mine action reflects primarily the experience of UN-managed 
programmes.  It does not capture well the situation of the majority of national mine 
action programmes which are usually supported by UNDP. Formally, UNDP-supported 
programmes are by definition nationally owned from their origin, although the strength 
of such ownership varies widely, and typically the programmes have not been 
nationalised from the beginning. Rather, technical advisors assist in establishing new 
functions and often play roles which go beyond the bounds of merely advisory.  
Azerbaijan illustrates the more frequent situation where the transition refers to shifting 
the balance between foreign and national staff in decision-making at all levels.  
Furthermore, it shows that, rather than seeking to “conclude UN-support”, the goal 
should be to have a fully nationalised programme which benefits from continuing 
partnership with the UN and others.  
 
FROM “EXCEPTIONS” TO “INSTITUTIONS” 
An important part of the transition is to establish the mine action role and functions 
within national institutions.  UN-managed programmes in all countries are “exceptions”.  
They are externally managed and cannot be part of the national institutional structure. 
It is because of their exceptional nature that they pay particularly close attention to 
coordination meetings and working groups – they are not part of the normal division of 
labour and need to encourage other institutions to act outside of their normal role. No 
matter how well-intentioned and competent their staff may be, agreements they make 
are inherently temporary.   
 
TRANSITION PROCESS 
ANAMA’s experience suggests that in most cases the transition process should not be 
complicated nor too drawn out. It required three basic elements:   
 
• a decision as to what should be developed as the capacities of the programme 
• a government decision to nationalise the programme, with a reasonable 
timeframe in which to gain experience under supervision and then assume 
responsibility 





Capacities developed at different rates and together they required about three years.  
The process benefited from a chief technical advisor, who supported the institutional 
development goals and process. 
 
ANAMA benefited from several conditions that may not always exist in other countries.  
First, the state structure had not collapsed.  Second, the Azeri population generally, and 
ANAMA staff in particular, have a relatively high level of general and professional 
education.  Third, ANAMA was created with a mandate to support safe return and 
development initiatives, and it depended directly on the inter-sectoral commission 
established to oversee reconstruction and development in the war-affected region 
chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister.  Fourth, the salary scale applied in ANAMA and to 
the demining organisations was relatively attractive without drastically distorting the 
national norm.  Fifth, government funding is essential for sustainability and it began to 
grow significantly with nationalisation. 
 
ANAMA staff see a difference between being a relatively autonomous, but temporary, 
UN-based structure and being part of the government, dealing with institutions and 
local culture. Clearer awareness of this difference might have changed some of the early 
assistance to ANAMA, eased some of the tensions that arose and facilitated the 
transition.   
CONTENT: WHAT TO TRANSITION 
At the beginning there is sometimes confusion between “national capacity” and 
“clearance capacity.”  In Azerbaijan, determining what capacities to develop and 
nationalise benefited from the advantage of catching up with older mine action 
programmes, with the important addition that all capacities developed were to be 
nationalised.  Therefore, operational capacities included manual demining, EOD, mine 
detecting dogs, demining machinery, technical and non-technical survey.  Operational 
management capacities included team leaders, site supervision, quality assurance, and 
training.  Other key capacities included information management, base and support 
management, public and donor relations, and planning.   
 
Tensions developed in a couple of cases when one of the parties involved seemed to 
resist the change in its role (eg, site supervision and resource mobilisation).  Through 
deliberate effort to resolve whether the difference was a matter of principle or 
readiness, and to keep clear the respective roles, the crises were overcome and further 
cooperation improved.  Support to capacity development and nationalisation should be 
the rule in TORs and supervision of mine action technical advisors and contractors. 
 
POST-TRANSITION DEVELOPMENT 
The experience of Azerbaijan demonstrates the increased ability of the national 




develop new methods and procedures that were better adapted to the national 
situation as well as to explore new opportunities for work and exchange with other 
programmes. Some important donors and the national government proved willing to 
entrust ANAMA with greater resources after it was fully nationalised.  With greater 
responsibility for their own programme and its results, the management and staff 
addressed greater attention to be more efficient and effective.  Some innovations may 
parallel developments in other countries (eg, land release at Zobjug), and can contribute 
to international advance in the matter.   
 
DON’T PUNISH SUCCESS, SUPPORT IT! 
The transition debate seems to suggest that once it has been completed there should 
be no need for further UN support.  This suggestion is particularly clear when the 
process is discussed as an “exit strategy.”  The Azerbaijan case shows the continuing 
importance of support and cooperation with the “post-transition” national programme.  
External funding continues to be important as will technical assistance in new areas and 
periodic external evaluation of specific issues or the programme as a whole.  What 
becomes more important is to ensure the national programme remains integrated into 
the international mine action network after the departure of the Chief Technical 
Advisor.   
 
Both the national programme and the international organisations should act to ensure 
that networking remains strong.  Since most organisations cooperate on the basis of a 
project/programme framework, it may be useful to maintain such a framework even 
with small amounts of funding in order to keep formal and informal channels of 









Table 1 – Mine /UXO Victims registered in ANAMA Database 
Year  Male  Female Children Total  
Status  Killed  Injured  Killed Injured  Killed  Injured  Killed  Injured 
As of December 2004 289 1,652 8 34 44 204 341 1,890 
During 2005 7 23 1 4 2 22 10 49 
During 2006 2 15 0 0 0 0 2 15 
During 2007 6 14 0 0 0 0 6 14 
During 2008 0 9 0 1 0 1 0 11 
During 2009 4 16 0 0 0 2 4 18 
During 2010 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 
During 2011 (through Sept) 3 2 0 1 1 0 4 3  
Total (through Sept 2011) 312 1,735 9 40 47 229 368 2,004 




Table 2 – Demining and land release in Azerbaijan 














2000 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.11 
2001 0.47 0.23 0.09 0.79 
2002 0.63 0.37 0.09 1.09 
2003 1.37 3.40 0.17 4.94 
2004 1.69 4.50 0.39 6.58 
2005 1.85 3.00 2.36 7.21 
2006 2.06 5.46 12.53 20.06 
2007 2.12 4.11 12.22 18.30 
2008 1.46 3.11 25.70 30.27 
2009 1.67 10.21 19.71 31.59 
2010 1.26 6.18 22.28 29.72 
Total 14.66 40.6 95.54 150.66 





Table 3 – Contributions of donors to the mine action programme of Azerbaijan 
Donor 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total USD 
UNDP 167,849 232,177 420,000 265,410 155,000 180,000 145,000 120,000 125,000 350,000 300,000 282,167 2,742,603 
Azerbaijan 124,111 603,537 242,000 258,760 203,417 255,000 749,561 1,241,379 2,235,296 6,312,500 8,086,793 8,997,993 29,310,347 
USA 1,698,039 1,040,633 1,125,000 1,275,461 1,803,979 2,326,840 2,200,000 1,633,113 483,000 1,503,148 15,089,213 
US-EUCOM 234,000 234,000 
EC 1,200,000 350,000 1,000,000 1,180,000 3,730,000 
Japan 486,724 78,807 70,000 635,531 
UK-DFID 200,000 250,000 75,000 271,490 796,490 
ITF 104,490 384,102 146,919 15,274 650,785 
Italy 400,000 240,000 640,000 
UNICEF 70,000 88,250 20,060 35,000 213,310 
Norway 112,140 112,140 
Canada 65,000 65,000 
NATO PfP 227,880 538,805 139,841 123,648 1,393,208 985,760 3,409,142 
Rotary Club 
of Baku 13770 13,770 
Saudi 
Arabia 50,000 50,000 
Sweden 47,522 23,858 71,380 
WWM 
Foundation 102,310 177,122 279,432 
Total 167,849 1,499,578 2,360,039 3,043,610 2,717,417 3,165,461 3,119,160 5,861,186 5,045,658 8,891,731 10,263,001 11,784,342 58,043,143 











Table 4 – Results of 2006 review in the 11 mine/UXO affected regions of Azerbaijan  




area (sq m) 
Mined areas Battle areas and 
areas 
contaminated by 
UXOs (sq m) 
Areas to be 
reduced/cancelled (sq m)                     
(constitutes about 90%)        
Areas to be cleared 
(constitutes about 10%)          
(sq m)  
Fizuli 47,379,000.00 42,638,760.00 4,737,640.00 2,600.00 
Terter 63,964,000.00 57,477,060.00 6,386,340.00 100,600.00 
Agstafa 10,550,000.00 6,427,156.50 714,128.50 3,408,715.00 
Agdam 18,835,550.00 16,887,941.10 1,876,437.90 71,171.00 
Gazakh 24,904,554.00 19,531,848.60 2,170,205.40 3,202,500.00 
Gedabey 68,501,790.00 60,362,316.00 6,706,924.00 1,432,550.00 
Goranboy 12,720,000.00 9,677,731.50 1,075,303.50 1,966,965.00 
Khanlar 16,785,480.00 10,601,262.00 1,177,918.00 5,006,300.00 
Khodjavend 26,145,040.00 23,530,536.00 2,614,504.00 0.00 
Tovuz 11,476,535.00 10,328,755.50 1,147,639.50 140.00 
Agjabedi 4,660,000.00 4,160,871.00 462,319.00 36,810.00 
TOTAL 305,921,949 261,624,238 29,069,360 15,228,351 




























































































































































































































































































































1 Aghdam 144 40 81 78 126 15 30 0 0 11 30 144 267 23341 4680 387 5879 1364 
2 Aghjabedy 62 19 47 0 0 16 30 15 30 11 22 61 129 23536 4108 313 5485 860 
3 Aghstafa 39 18 37 20 40 11 15 0 0 0 0 49 92 14270 3561 183 4200 664 
4 Beylagan 53 18 36 0 0 0 0 15 30 18 41 51 107 17262 3162 380 6196 600 
5 Dashkesan 49 24 39 13 22 0 0 14 26 0 0 51 87 5561 790 200 1952 734 
6 Fizuli 80 39 84 8 16 0 0 0 0 5 15 52 115 14874 2137 287 3912 773 
7 Qazakh 47 26 49 15 30 6 15 0 0 0 0 47 94 15850 3054 164 3898 608 
8 Gadabey 85 24 47 36 61 0 0 27 54 0 0 87 162 15401 2944 271 3594 1253 
9 Goranboy 81 18 34 0 0 0 0 13 26 46 89 77 149 19100 3583 128 2750 618 
10 Goygol 49 21 39 0 0 10 20 19 38 0 0 50 97 10311 1911 159 2550 676 
11 Tartar 48 20 40 0 0 23 45 10 20 0 0 53 105 12659 2476 195 3174 720 
12 Tovuz 85 25 51 20 40 27 45 14 26 0 0 86 162 29714 6210 352 6791 1368 
13 Xodjavand 20 11 23 8 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 34 2205 206 82 686 263 
14 
Nakhchivan AR 7 
border districts 
with Armenia 
228 0 0 50 102 0 0 0 0 177 381 227 483 63569 10420 550 7520 680 
15 Lachin 149 0 0 74 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 142 14886 1232 150 1282 994 
16 Kalbadjar 114 0 0 47 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 88 10879 797 94 1050 697 
17 Jabrail 60 0 0 7 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 9274 101 16 112 244 
18 Shusha 24 0 0 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 2811 58 12 70 84 
Total: 1417 303 607 379 700 108 200 127 250 268 578 1185 2335 305503 51430 3923 61101 13200 





Table 6 – Review progress in relation to LIS-identified impacted communities 
District High impact Medium 
impact 
Low impact None 
impacted 
Total 
  LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review LIS Review 
Aghdam 0 1 6 2 19 5 0 11 25 19 
Aghjabedi 0 1 1 0 21 1 0 11 22 13 
Aghstafa 2 2 2 8 16 35 0 22 20 67 
Baku city   0   2   0   0   2 
Beylagan 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 2 6 3 
Fizuli 4 3 35 10 135 11 0 15 174 39 
Ganja City 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 2 3 
Gazakh 1 0 6 1 18 8 0 12 25 21 
Gedabey 1 0 16 0 68 13 0 29 85 42 
Geranboy 1 0 8 3 10 6 0 9 19 18 
Goygol(Khanlar) 0 0 4 1 16 5 0 14 20 20 
Hajigabul 0   0   1   0   1   
Imishly 0   0   1   0   1   
Jalilabad 0   1   2   0   3   
Khojavend 0 1 0 1 11 0 0 0 11 2 
Lenkeran 0   1   5   0   6   
Naftalan City 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 1 
Samukh   0   1   2   6   9 
Sumgayit city   0   0   1   0   1 
Terter 1 0 9 2 13 1 0 13 23 16 
Tovuz 1 0 13 1 20 11 0 15 34 27 
Total: 11 8 102 33 367 102 0 160 480 303 
Note: The two surveys involved differing methodologies, but both sought to include all 
mine/ERW affected communities and 2006 review started from results of 2002-2003 LIS. 












Table 7 – ANAMA capacity development strategic plan  
Capacity 
2009 1st year  2nd year 3rd year 4th year 
Existing 
capacity 




3 clearance  
teams;                     
4 technical 
survey teams              
(170 staff) 
6 clearance  
teams; 
 6 technical 
survey teams                        
( 293 staff) 
9 clearance  
teams;                      
9 technical 
survey teams               
(416 staff) 
12 clearance  
teams; 
12  technical 
survey teams             
(539 staff) 
15 clearance  
teams;                    
15 technical 
survey teams              
(700 staff) 
UXO Clearance  70 staff 70 staff 70 staff 70 staff 70 staff 
Emergency 
Response Team  
18 staff 18 staff 18 staff 18 staff 18 staff 
 
MDD Section 
33 MDD 53 MDD 70 MDD 87 MDD 100 MDD 
 
MDM Section 




ANAMA HQ                    
2 Regional 
Bases                        
3 Operational 
Centres 
ANAMA HQ                    
3 Regional 
Bases                      
4 Operational 
Centres 
ANAMA HQ                   
4 Regional Bases                     
4 Operational 
Centres 
ANAMA HQ                       
6 Regional 
Bases            
4 Operational 
Centres 
ANAMA HQ                       
7 Regional 
Bases            
4 Operational 
Centres 












































2 Fizuli 1 386,0 40 10 
3 Jebrayil 1 050,0 40 5 
4 Gubadli 802,0 50 10 
5 Zangilan 707,0 25 5 
6 Lachin 1 835,0 55 10 
7 Kelbadjar 1 936,0 100 20 





  437,0 86,2 
Note:   *Priority areas include roads, places of settlement, communication lines, water canals, electricity lines, etc  
           ** This is to be done by rapid and effective capacity increase up to 740 manual deminers, 120 mine detection dogs   
              and 26 machines for mechanical clearance, 7 regional bases    




Table 9 – Summary of national and international financial contributions to ANAMA 
Year National (USD) International (USD) Total (USD) 
2010 8,997,993 2,786,349 11,784,342 
2009 8,086,793 2,176,208 10,263,001 
2008 6,132,500 2,7594,231 8,891,731 
2007 2,235,296 2,810,362 5,045,658 
2006 1,241,379 4,619,807 5,861,186 
2005 749,961 2,369,199 3,119,160 
2004 255,000 2,910,461 3,165,461 
2003 203,417 2,514,000 2,717,417 
2002 258,760 2,784,850 3,043,610 
2001 242,000 2,118,039 2,360,039 
2000 603,537 896,041 1,499,578 
1999 124,111 167,849 291,960 
Total 29,310,347 28,732,796 58,043,143 
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ANNEX 2  
 
Institutional Structure of ANAMA in Original UNDP-Government Prodoc 
 
 
Initial staffing proposal (see table below) included 18 staff for ANAMA.  The proposed structure 
did not allow for level or type of staffing appropriate for a government institution with these 




























Functions Functions Functions 
Planning/prioritisation/coord
ination - develop NMAP 
Survey data processing Financial Management 
Contracting   Mine Awareness  Procurement 
Clearance, survey, marking 
Operations 
Mine Information System Advocacy 
& PR Resource Mobilisation  
Personnel Administration 
Training    Logistic Support 
Victim Support   
Quality Assurance    
 
International Advisory Group 
(IAG) 
 
State Commission for 
Rehabilitation 
Azerbaijan National 























Operations Manager 1 
Operations Officer 1 
QA/standards Officer 1 
Operations Assistant 1 
Mine Awareness Officer 1 
Information Manager 1 
Computer Technician 1 

















ANAMA Organisational Chart 
 
(Staff Total = 42) 
 
 
